Evidence and plausibility in neighborhood structures by van Benthem, Johan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
7.
12
77
v1
  [
ma
th.
LO
]  
4 J
ul 
20
13
Evidence and plausibility in neighborhood
structures
Johan van Benthem
University of Amsterdam
David Ferna´ndez-Duque
Universidad de Sevilla
Eric Pacuit
University of Maryland
September 5, 2018
Abstract
The intuitive notion of evidence has both semantic and syntactic fea-
tures. In this paper, we develop an evidence logic for epistemic agents
faced with possibly contradictory evidence from different sources. The
logic is based on a neighborhood semantics, where a neighborhood N in-
dicates that the agent has reason to believe that the true state of the
world lies in N . Further notions of relative plausibility between worlds
and beliefs based on the latter ordering are then defined in terms of this
evidence structure, yielding our intended models for evidence-based be-
liefs. In addition, we also consider a second more general flavor, where
belief and plausibility are modeled using additional primitive relations,
and we prove a representation theorem showing that each such general
model is a p-morphic image of an intended one. This semantics invites a
number of natural special cases, depending on how uniform we make the
evidence sets, and how coherent their total structure. We give a struc-
tural study of the resulting ‘uniform’ and ‘flat’ models. Our main result
are sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics of all four major
model classes with respect to the modal language of evidence, belief and
safe belief. We conclude with an outlook toward logics for the dynamics of
changing evidence, and the resulting language extensions and connections
with logics of plausibility change.
1 Introduction
It has become standard practice in Artificial Intelligence and Game Theory to
use possible-worlds models to describe the knowledge and beliefs of a group
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of agents. In such models, the agents’ knowledge is based on what is true
throughout the set of epistemically accessible worlds, the current information
range. Following a similar pattern, the agents’ beliefs are based on what is true
in the set of most “plausible” worlds. Now, it is often implicitly assumed that
the agents arrived at these structures through some process of investigation, but
these details are no longer present in the models.
In a number of areas, ranging from epistemology to computer science and
decision theory, the need has been recognized for models that keep track of
the “reasons”, or the evidence for beliefs and other informational attitudes (cf.
[20, 18, 4, 31]). Encoding evidence as the current range of worlds the agent
considers possible ignores how the agent arrived at this epistemic state. This
also ignores the fine-structure of evidence that allows us to consider or modify
just parts of it. One extreme for recording this additional structure are models
with complete syntactic details of what the agent has learned so far (including
the precise formulation and sources for each piece of evidence) (cf. [37]). In this
paper, we will explore a middle ground in between ranges of possible worlds and
syntactic fine-structure, viz. neighborhood models, where the available evidence
is recorded as a family of sets of worlds. Our models are not unlike some earlier
proposals in the study of conditionals and belief revision (cf. [19, 39, 11, 25]),
but we quickly strike out in other directions, and provide a more in-depth logical
treatment.
This paper is a continuation of our earlier work in [36, 35] on a new evidence
interpretation of neighborhood models.1 In a neighborhood model, each state
is assigned a collection of subsets of the set of states. We view these different
collections of subsets as the evidence that the agent has acquired – allowing
the agent to have different evidence at different states. Given such an explicit
description of the evidence that the agent has acquired, one can explore different
notions of beliefs and related cognitive attitudes over neighborhood models. The
logical systems that arise on natural model classes of this sort with modalities for
evidence and belief have been axiomatized completely in [35]. In this paper, we
go one step further, and add some further crucial structure to the neighborhood
structures.
In general, there are two ways we can enrich neighborhood structures with
descriptions of the agent’s beliefs. The first approach is to add new accessibility
relations corresponding to each epistemic or doxastic attitude in the neighbor-
hood structure. We then impose constraints on these new relations to ensure
that they are “appropriately grounded” on the available evidence. The second
approach is to define the agent’s beliefs and related cognitive attitudes directly
using no more than the given evidence structure in the neighborhood structures.
The latter “intended models” may be considered as a special case of the former
“general models”. This paper offers a careful study of these two approaches.
Our second new contribution is to elaborate on the relationship between our
neighborhood models and another general framework for belief change in the
1Neighborhood models have been used to provide a semantics for both normal and non-
normal modal logics. See [26] for an early discussion of neighborhood models and their logics,
and [16, 22, 17] for modern motivations and mathematical details.
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modal tradition. Originally used as a semantics for conditionals [?, cf.]]lewis-
conditionals, plausibility models are wide-spread in modal logics of belief [32,
33, 5, 13]. The main idea is to endow epistemic ranges with an ordering w 4 v
of relative plausibility on worlds (usually uniform across epistemic equivalence
classes): “(according to the agent) world v is at least as plausible as w”.2 Plau-
sibility orders are typically assumed to be reflexive and transitive, and often
even connected, making every two worlds comparable. Connections between
evidence structure and plausibility order will occur throughout this paper, and
their reflection in logical axioms will be determined.
In all, we shall consider four variants of the logic of evidence-based belief,
which depend on some fundamental assumptions one may make about evidence
models, in terms of uniformity of evidence across worlds, and total coherence of
maximally consistent sets of evidence. For each of the resulting logics, we prove
two main results. The first is a characterization theorem for general evidence
models as being p-morphic images of intended models. The second result de-
termines a complete deductive calculus for each logic. Here our representation
using extended evidence models is crucial, since it permits us to employ familiar
techniques from modal logic.
Anyone familiar with Sergei Artemov’s work will have seen a similarity by
now. It is very natural to attach to every believed proposition a “justification”
for that proposition. This idea was first studied in Artemov’s seminal paper
[3] and applied to epistemic logic in [2] (see [4] for an overview and pointers to
the relevant literature). In particular, t :ϕ is intended to mean that the agent
believes ϕ and that t is the justification for this belief. Here t is a proof term,
and sophisticated logical systems have been developed that extend traditional
“provability logic” to reason explicitly about the logical structure of these justi-
fications.3 Moreover, an appealing semantics exists for these systems (cf. [10])
that combines ideas from possible worlds semantics and the syntax of proof
terms. The approach in the current paper is more coarse-grained, since we do
not give ourselves proof or evidence terms that can be manipulated in our de-
ductive systems. Nevertheless, we hope to show that even at our chosen level of
modeling evidence, an amazing amount of fine-structure exists. A deeper com-
parison between our approach and justification logic seems a well-worth effort,
but it is one step beyond the horizon of this paper.4
This paper is organized as follows. The next section (Section 2) introduces
the logical systems that we will study. Each of these logical systems is de-
fined using sublanguages of a single modal language, which includes both a
non-normal modality (the “evidence-for” modality) and normal modalities (two
belief modalities and a universal modality). One important theme in this paper
2In conditional semantics, such plausibility or ‘similarity’ orders are typically world-
dependent.
3By now, these systems have been applied to a variety of issues in epistemology and game
theory, and other fields: see [4] for the relevant references.
4For the moment, we can only refer to [6] for a system that merges features of justification
logic with plausibility models and syntax dynamics in the style of “dynamic-epistemic logic”
[33], an enterprise close to the spirit of the present paper.
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is that there are two different types of models that can be used as a semantics
for this language. The first type of model is a neighborhood structure where the
relations used to interpret the normal modalities are derived from the neighbor-
hood function. The second type of model extends neighborhood models with
relations, one for each belief operator. Our first technical contribution is to
clarify the relationship between these two types of models (Sections 2.2 and 4).
More generally, we compare these models with the more standard plausibility
models often used to represent a rational agent’s belief in Section 3. Sections
5 and 6 contain our second main contribution of this paper: proofs that our
axiom systems are complete with respect to their intended class of models. Sec-
tion 7 returns to the original motivation for studying evidence logic from [36]:
developing dynamic logics of evidence management. We offer some concluding
remarks in Section 8.
2 Logics of evidence and belief
We start by presenting the logical system that we will study in this paper. Given
a set W of possible worlds or states, one of which represents the “actual” situ-
ation, an agent gathers evidence about this situation from a variety of sources.
To simplify things, we assume these sources provide binary evidence, i.e., sub-
sets of W which (may) contain the actual world. The following modal language
can be used to describe what the agent believes given her available evidence (cf.
[36]).
Definition 1. Let At be a fixed set of atomic propositions. Let L = LABE4 be
the smallest set of formulas generated by the following grammar
p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [B]ϕ | [E]ϕ | [A]ϕ | [4]ϕ
where p ∈ At. The propositional connectives (∧,→,↔) are defined as usual and
the duals5 of [E], [B], [4] and [A] are 〈E〉, [B], 〈4〉 and 〈A〉, respectively.
A signature is a subset of {A,B,E,4}, written usually as a string rather
than a set. Sublanguages L′ ⊆ L will be denoted by Lσ, where σ is a signature,
and L′ contains only formulas with modalities in the signature.
The intended interpretation of [E]ϕ is “the agent has evidence for ϕ” and
[B]ϕ says that “the agents believes that ϕ is true.” The modality [4]ϕ refers
to the plausibility order to be introduced below, and it has become standard
to read it as “the agent safely believes that ϕ is true”, though we will really
explore this interpretation only in Section 3. We also include the universal
modality ([A]ϕ: “ϕ is true in all states”) for technical convenience.6
Since we do not assume that the sources of the evidence are jointly consistent
(or even that a single source is guaranteed to be consistent and provide all
5In other words, 〈B〉 = ¬[B]¬, and similarly for other operators.
6A natural interpretation of [A]ϕ in the single-agent context of this paper is as “the agent
knows that ϕ”.
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the available evidence), the “evidence for” operator ([E]ϕ) is not a normal
modal operator. That is, the agent may have evidence for ϕ and evidence for ψ
([E]ϕ ∧ [E]ψ) without having evidence for their conjunction (¬[E](ϕ ∧ ψ)). Of
course, the two belief and universal operators are normal modal operators. So,
the logical systems we study in this paper combine a non-normal modal logic
with a normal one.
2.1 Models for L and its fragments
Our background assumption is that the agent uses the evidence she has gathered
at each state to form her beliefs. There are two ways to make this precise. The
first is to ground the agent’s beliefs (defined as relations on the set of states) on
the evidence available at each state via a number of technical assumptions. The
second way is to define the agent’s beliefs directly in terms of the evidence avail-
able at each state. These different options lead us to consider several different
signatures. This motivates the following general definition of a model:
Definition 2. Let σ be a signature containing E and not containing7 A. A
σ-structure is a tuple M = 〈W, 〈I(m)〉m∈σ , V 〉, where W is a non-empty set
of worlds and
• if E ∈ σ then I(E) ⊆W × ℘(W ) is an evidence relation,
• if 4∈ σ then I(4) is a plausibility order on W : I(4) is reflexive and
transitive.8
• if B ∈ σ then I(B) is an (arbitrary) binary relation on W , and9
• V : At→ ℘(W ) is a valuation function.
We will not distinguish between m ∈ σ and its denotation I(m) in what
follows, and we will write E(w) for the set {X | wEX}.
A σ-structure is a σ-model if it further satisfies the following constraints:
1. for each w ∈ W , ∅ 6∈ E(w) and W ∈ E(w) and
2. if 4 ∈ σ then for all w, v, u ∈ W , if w 4 v and w ∈ X ∈ E(u) it follows
that v ∈ X and
3. whenever w 4 v and u B w, it follows that u B v.
7The universal modality will always be interpreted according to its intended meaning and
need not be represented explicitly in the models. In addition, we consider evidence the most
fundamental notion in our setting and assume it always in our signature.
8In the literature 4 is usually assumed to be converse well-founded, but we shall work in
a more general setting. Note that the plausibility relation need not be connected.
9For readers familiar with the more standard literature on modal logics of belief, it is
natural to wonder why we include a separate relation for our belief modalities (rather than
using the plausibility ordering to define belief in the usual way). The reason for working with
this more general definition is discussed in Sections 2.2 and 3.
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An evidence model is a σ-model where σ = E. We may also write simply
model instead of σ-model when the value of σ is clear from context.
The following basic assumptions are implicit in the above definition:
• Sources may or may not be reliable: a subset recording a piece of evidence
need not contain the actual world. Also, agents need not know which
evidence is reliable.
• The evidence gathered from different sources (or even the same source)
may be jointly inconsistent. And so, the intersection of all the gathered
evidence may be empty.
• Despite the fact that sources may not be reliable or jointly inconsistent,
they are all the agent has for forming beliefs.10
The evidential state of the agent is the set of all propositions (i.e., subsets
of W ) identified by the agent’s sources. In general, this could be any collection
of subsets of W ; but we do impose some mild conditions, that were stated in
Constraint 1 in the above definition of our models:
• No evidence set is empty (evidence per se is never contradictory),
• The whole universe W is an evidence set (agents know their ‘space’).
In addition, one might expect a ‘monotonicity’ assumption:
If the agent has evidence X and X ⊆ Y then the agent has evidence
Y .
To us, however, this is a property of propositions supported by evidence, not
of the evidence itself. Therefore, we model this feature differently through the
definition of our “evidence for” modality (see Definition 3).
Next, constraint 2 in the definition of our models ensures that the agent’s
evidence “coheres” with her opinions about the relative plausibility of the states.
The intended interpretation of w 4 v is that, although the agent does not know
which of w or v is the “actual situation”, she considers v at least as plausible as
w. Thus, if X is evidence that the actual state may be w (i.e., w ∈ X), then X
is also evidence for all states that the agent considers at least as plausible as w.
The underlying idea is that the agent uses her plausibility ordering to “fill-out”
the sets of states identified as evidence. We will also consider the even more
constrained situation where the agent defines her plausibility ordering directly
from the evidence (this is discussed in Section 2.2).
Finally, constraint 3 on our evidence models generalizes the usual assumption
that the agent believes what holds throughout the set of most plausible worlds:
Any state the agent believes is possible must be among the most plausible states
overall, though we will not require that the converse always holds.
Let us define truth for formulas of L in a given model:
10Modeling sources and agents’ trust in these is quite feasible in our setting – but we will
not pursue this topic here.
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Definition 3. Let M = 〈W,E,B,4, V 〉 be an evidence model. Truth of a
formula ϕ ∈ L is defined inductively as follows:
• M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p) (p ∈ At)
• M, w |= ¬ϕ iff M, w 6|= ϕ
• M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ
• M, w |= [E]ϕ iff there exists X such that wEX and for all v ∈ X,M, v |=
ϕ
• M, w |= [B]ϕ if for all v, if w B v, then M, v |= ϕ
• M, w |= [4]ϕ iff for all v, if v < w, then M, v |= ϕ
• M, w |= [A]ϕ iff for all v ∈W , M, v |= ϕ
The truth set of ϕ is the set [[ϕ]]M = {w | M, w |= ϕ}. The standard logical
notions of satisfiability and validity are defined as usual.
2.2 From general models to intended models
In this section, we consider an alternative way of interpreting our modal lan-
guage L, specializing the above “general models” to a special class where belief is
entirely and explicitly evidence-driven. Rather than interpreting each modality
as a new relation on the set of states, we will now derive the relevant relations
from the evidence sets. As a result, we can interpret the entire language L on
an evidence model M = 〈W,E, V 〉.
Recall that we do not assume that the collection of evidence sets E(w) is
closed under supersets. Also, even though evidence pieces are non-empty, their
combination through the obvious operations of taking intersections need not
yield consistent evidence: we allow for disjoint evidence sets, whose combina-
tion may lead (and should lead) to trouble. But importantly, even though an
agent may not be able to consistently combine all of her evidence, there will be
maximal collections of admissible evidence that she can safely put together to
form scenarios:
Definition 4. A w-scenario is a maximal collection X ⊆ E(w) that has the
fip (i.e., the finite intersection property: for each finite subfamily {X1, . . . , Xn}
⊆ X we have that
⋂
1≤i≤nXi 6= ∅). A collection is called a scenario if it is a
w-scenario for some state w.
Our notion of having evidence for ϕ need not imply that the agent believes
ϕ. In order to believe a proposition ϕ, the agent must consider all her evidence
for or against ϕ. The idea is that each w-scenario represents a maximally
consistent theory based on (some of) the evidence collected at w. 11 Note that
the definition of truth of the “evidence for” operator builds in monotonicity.
11Analogous ideas occur in semantics of conditionals [19, 39] and belief revision [11, 25].
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That is, the agent has evidence for ϕ at w provided there is some evidence
available at w that implies ϕ. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 5. Given an evidence function E : W → ℘(W ), we define BE ⊆
W ×W by w BE v if v ∈
⋂
X for some w-scenario X .
In order to derive a plausibility ordering, we borrow a ubiquitous idea, oc-
curring in point-set topology, but also in recent theories of relation merge (cf.
[1, 21]): the so-called specialization (pre)-order. Under this ordering, v is more
plausible than w if every set that is evidence for w is also evidence for v. For-
mally, we define the following:
Definition 6. Given a evidence function E : W → ℘(W ), we define 4E⊆
W ×W by w 4E v if whenever u,X are such that w ∈ X ∈ E(u), then v ∈ X.
To make this definition a bit more concrete, here is a simple illustration.
w1 w2 w3 w4
E
w2
w1
w3
w4
4E
w1 w2 w3 w4
E ′
w1 w3
w2 w4
4E′
Note that the derived relation 4E is uniform throughout the model, even
though evidence itself is not. It is indeed possible to define a point-wise variant
of the specialization order with u as parameter, but we shall not explore this
option in this paper.
Given an evidence modelM = 〈W,E, V 〉, we now define the extended struc-
ture
M△ = 〈W,E,BE ,4E, V 〉.
We extend the truth-definitions on M to all of L by setting J·KM = J·KM△ . If
M = 〈W,E, V 〉△, we sayM is an intended model.
We will be interested in the precise relationship between intended models
M△ and our earlier general models M = 〈W,E,B,4, V 〉. This issue will be
discussed in detail in the remainder of the paper, but we conclude this section
with a brief remark. Notice that, in general, M = 〈W,E,B,4E , V 〉 is not
necessarily a model according to Definition 2. The problem is that the constraint
stating that if w B v 4E u then w B u is not necessarily satisfied. A particularly
simple example is a uniform model whereW = {w, v} and E(w) = E(v) = {W}.
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If we take, for example, B = {(w,w)}, then it should be clear that w B w 4E v
yet w 6B v.
However, this can never happen over an intended model:
Lemma 1. Suppose that M = 〈W,E, V 〉 is an evidence model, then M△ is a
model according to Definition 2.
Proof. Most conditions are obvious; the only one that we need to check is that
if u BE w and w 4E v then u BE v. Since u BE w, there is a scenario X such
that w ∈
⋂
X . But since w 4E v, it follows that also v ∈
⋂
X , and since X was
a u-scenario, we have that u BE v.
2.3 p-morphisms
It is important to identify maps between structures which preserve truth-sets.
In our setting, the following definition will be very useful:
Definition 7. Given evidence models M1 = 〈W1, B1, E1,41, V1〉 and M2 =
〈W2, B2, E2,42, V2〉, we say a function π : W1 → W2 is a p-morphism if the
following conditions hold:
atoms V1 = π
−1V2
forthR if w B1 v then π(w) B2 π(v)
backR if π(w) B2 u then there is v ∈ π−1(u) such that w B1 v
forthE if w E1 X then there is Y ⊆W2 such that π(w) E2 Y and Y ⊆ π[X ]
backE if π(w) E2 Y then there is X such that π[X ] ⊆ Y and w E1 X
forth4 if w 41 v then π(w) 42 π(v)
back4 if π(w) 42 u then there is v ∈ π−1(u) such that w 41 v
We define p-morphism between structures of smaller signature by restricting
the above conditions accordingly.
Then we obtain the following familiar result which we present without its
straightforward inductive proof:
Theorem 1. If π is a p-morphism between σ-models M1 and M2 and ϕ is any
formula over the signature σ, then
[[ϕ]]M1 = π
−1[[[ϕ]]M2 ].
If a surjective p-morphism exists fromM1 toM2, we will writeM1 ≫M2.
In Section 4 we will show that, given a general evidence model M, there is an
evidence model M▽ = 〈W▽, E▽, V ▽〉 such that (M▽)△ ≫M. Thus a general
evidence model may always be represented as a p-morphic image of an intended
evidence model. This intended model M▽, however, will often be much larger.
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2.4 Special classes of evidence models
The class of evidence models we have described gives the most general setting
such an agent may face. However, there are natural additional assumptions one
may consider:
Definition 8. Suppose that M is a (EB4)-model. We say M is flat if when-
ever w E X there is v ∈ X such that w B v.
We say M is uniform if E and B are constant (that is, given u, v, w, then
wBv if and only if uBv, and given w, v, E(w) = E(v)), and whenever w B v
it follows that v is 4-maximal. In this case, we shall treat E as a set E (of
neighborhoods) rather than a function and B as a set of points.
Finally, we say M is concise if it is flat, uniform and, whenever w is 4-
maximal then w ∈ B.
The reason for this terminology will show in the arguments to follow. The
definition applies, mutatis mutandis, to models with different signatures (e.g.,
evidence models). Lemma 4 shows that ifM = 〈W, E , V 〉 is a uniform intended
evidence model then every point in BE is maximal, whereas if M△ is flat as
well, then BE coincides exactly with the set of maximal points. Note, however,
that in general the property of being concise is stronger than that of merely
being flat and uniform.
Flatness may seem like an odd assumption but it is actually very natural
because every finite intended model is flat, though infinite models need not be.
Uniformity is also natural because one often wishes to model a situation where
an agent either has or does not have evidence right at the beginning, rather
than obtaining different evidence at each state.
2.5 The logics
We now turn to logics for reasoning about distinct classes of evidence models.
Our first observation is that the language L is sensitive to flatness:
Lemma 2. If M is a flat model, then M |= [E]ϕ→ 〈B〉ϕ.
Proof. If X ∈ E(w) is an evidence set witnessing ϕ (i.e., X ⊆ [[ϕ]]M), then the
singleton {X} can be extended to a w-scenario using Zorn’s Lemma, which, in
flat structures, has a non-empty intersection.
Meanwhile, the formula [E]ϕ → 〈B〉ϕ is not valid in general. To see this,
consider a uniform evidence model M∞ = 〈W,E, V 〉 with domain W = N and
evidence sets E(w) = E = {[N,∞) | N ∈ N} ∪ {W} for each w ∈ W . The
valuation is unimportant, so we may let V = ∅. Clearly, the only scenario on
M∞ is all of E , but
⋂
E = ∅. Hence M∞ |= [B]⊥, i.e., M∞ 6|= 〈B〉⊤; yet
M∞ |= [E]⊤ (this formula is universally valid), and we conclude
M∞ 6|= [E]⊤ → 〈B〉⊤.
From this we get the following corollary:
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Corollary 1. The logic of evidence models does not have the finite model prop-
erty, nor does the logic of uniform evidence models.
Proof. Every finite model is flat, and hence it validates [E]⊤ → 〈B〉⊤; but as
we have just shown, this formula of our language is not valid over all uniform
evidence models.
With this in mind, we state a list of axioms and rules for evidence logics:
Name Formula Logic(s)
tautology all propositional tautologies all
S5A S5 axioms for A all
KB K axioms for B all
S44 S4 axioms for [4] all
no empty evidence 〈E〉⊤ all
pullout [E]ϕ ∧ [A]ψ ↔ [E](ϕ ∧ [A]ψ) all
universality [A]ϕ→ [X ]ϕ for X = E,B,4 all
E-monotonicity
ϕ→ ψ
[E]ϕ→ [E]ψ
all
Name Formula Logic(s)
plausible evidence [E]ϕ→ [E](ϕ ∧ [4]ϕ) all
B-monotonicity [B]ϕ→ [B][4]ϕ all
flatness [E]ϕ→ 〈B〉ϕ ♭, ♭u
©-uniformity ©ϕ→ [A]© ϕ u, ♭u
for © = [B], 〈B〉, [E], 〈E〉
maximality 〈B〉(〈4〉α ∧ β)→ 〈B〉(α ∧ 〈4〉β) u, ♭u
conciseness [B]ϕ→ 〈4〉[4]ϕ ♭u
MP Modus Ponens all
NA
ϕ
[A]ϕ
all
The above table gives a family of axioms which in turn define a family of
logics; given a signature σ, we let Evσ denote the logic which uses only those
axioms and rules that fall within Lσ and are marked “all”. The subscripts ♭, u
denote the addition of the respective axioms; note that the logic Evσ♭u includes
the additional conciseness axiom which is not present in any other logic. We
will denote derivability in the logic λ by ⊢λ, where λ is any one of the four com-
binations that we may form from a given σ, that is, λ ∈ {Evσ,Evσ♭ ,Ev
σ
u,Ev
σ
♭u}.
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If Θ is a (possibly infinite) set of formulas, Θ ⊢λ ϕ means that there is a finite
Θ′ ⊆ Θ such that ⊢λ
∧
Θ′ → ϕ.
These axioms are sound for their respective classes of models:
Theorem 2. The logics Evσ,Evσ♭ ,Ev
σ
u,Ev
σ
♭u are sound for the classes of all
σ-models, all uniform σ-models, all flat σ-models and all concise σ-models, re-
spectively.
Proof. We assume familiarity with neighborhood semantics and well-known
modal logics, so we will restrict ourselves to commenting on the more unusual
axioms.
LetM be any model; by passing toM△ if necessary, we may assume without
loss of generality that M = 〈W,E,B,4, V 〉.
Let us begin by checking plausible evidence. Suppose that w ∈ J[E]ϕKM,
so that there is X ∈ E(w) such that X ⊆ JϕKM. Pick v ∈ X and suppose v 4 u.
Then, u ∈ X , so that u ∈ JϕKM; since u was arbitrary, v ∈ Jϕ ∧ [4]ϕKM and
thus w ∈ J[E](ϕ ∧ [4]ϕ)KM, as claimed.
The B-monotonicity axiom follows easily from the condition that if u 4 v
and w B u, then w B v.
The flatness axiom is Lemma 2 while conciseness follows from Theorem
3, which we prove later, and it gives the slightly stronger [B]ϕ→ [A]〈4〉[4]ϕ.
Finally, the maximality axiom uses the fact that, over concise models,
every element of B is maximal. For indeed, if 〈B〉(α ∧ 〈4〉β) holds, there is
some w ∈ B ∩ Jα ∧ 〈4〉βKM and thus some v < w with v ∈ JβKM. Since w is
maximal we must have that v 4 w and that v is maximal as well, so that v ∈ B
and v satisfies 〈4〉α. But it also satisfies β, so we have that 〈B〉(〈4〉α ∧ β)
holds.
The weakest logic Ev will be called general evidence logic, while Ev♭,Ev♭u
will be called flat logics and Evu,Ev♭u will be called uniform logics. We will
write λ-consistency for consistency over the logic λ.
3 Belief and plausibility
Now we step aside, and consider a different tradition in modeling beliefs.
A plausibility model is a tuple 〈W,4, V 〉 where W is a nonempty set, V is
a valuation function and 4 is a reflexive, transitive and well-founded order on
W . We assume the reader is familiar with these well-studied models and the
modal languages used to reason about them (see [33] for details and pointers
to the relevant literature). Our evidence models are not intended to replace
plausibility models, but rather to complement them. So, what exactly is the
relationship between these two frameworks for modeling beliefs? The answer is
subtle (see [36, Section 5] for some initial observations).
On plausibility models, it is commonplace to say that an agent believes a
formula if it is true in all the 4-maximal worlds. This makes belief definable
in the language containing only the universal modality [A] and the plausibility
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modality [4], namely, as [A]〈4〉[4]ϕ.12 This may look like a simple technical
ploy, but Baltag and Smets [5] interpret [4]ϕ independently as “a safe belief in
ϕ”. Following [29], they show that this amounts to the beliefs the agent retains
under all new true information about the actual world.13 Our first observation
is that our belief operator [B] is not similarly definable over the class of all
evidence models.
Lemma 3. The modality [B] is not definable in terms of [A], [E], [4], even over
uniform intended evidence models.
Proof. The modelM∞ from Corollary 1 will do. Observe thatM△∞ is bisimilar
to the trivial model A△ where A has one point w and one evidence set {w}
(simply because all propositional variables are false). Yet M△∞ |= [B]⊥ while
the model A△ is finite, and hence it validates [B]⊤.
The situation changes over the class of flat models. Here the following notion
will be useful later:
Definition 9. Given a uniform evidence model M = 〈W, E , V 〉, write E [w] =
{X ∈ E | w ∈ X}.
This construction suggests an extension to our language that we will briefly
discuss before moving on to the main result of this section. While what follows
can be skipped without loss of continuity, it does give a more concrete idea of
the many natural kinds of evidence structure to be found in our models.
Digression: reliable and unreliable evidence Suppose thatM = 〈W, E , V 〉
is a uniform evidence model. Then E [w] is the set of evidence that is “correct”
or reliable at state w. Unlike the agent’s full evidential state at w, the set of
reliable evidence at w can always be consistently combined, suggesting a new
modality [C]ϕ meaning “the agent’s reliable evidence entails ϕ” or, for lack of
a better term, “ϕ is reliably believed”. The formal definition is:
M, w |= [C]ϕ iff for all v ∈
⋂
E [w], M, v |= ϕ
There is one technical issue we need to address here, which has interesting
consequences. Note that the set of reliable evidence differs from state to state.
That is, even if the evidence function is assumed to be constant, the reliable
evidence function will not be constant. This means that, unlike plain belief,
even in uniform evidence models, reliable belief does not satisfy introspection
properties. So, what type of doxastic attitude is C? We do not have the space
here for an extensive discussion, but here are a few comments.
12This is not quite correct if there is more than one information cell (i.e., equivalence class
of the knowledge relation). The formula [A]〈4〉[4]ϕ means that ϕ is believed at all states in
the model. We are implicitly assuming that there is only one “information cell” for the agent,
namely the set of all states W . In this case, the universal modality [A] is best interpreted as
“knowledge”.
13For the same notion in the computer science literature on agency, see [28]. Also, see [30]
for related discussions.
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First, notice that C validates the truth axiom (Cϕ → ϕ), so believing
something based on reliable evidence implies truth. Of course, it is only the
modeler, from a third person perspective, who can actually determine what
the agent believes based only on reliable evidence. Since the agent does not
have access to the actual world, she herself cannot determine which evidence is
reliable and which is not. Second, the restriction to “truthful” evidence suggests
that reliable belief might be safe belief on evidence models. However, the derived
plausibility ordering is typically not connected, and on such models, safe belief
quantifies over all worlds not strictly less plausible than the current world. In
particular, if ϕ is safely believed at a world w in a non-connected plausibility
model, then ϕ must be true at all worlds that are incomparable with w. Now,
for a derived plausibility ordering, there are two reasons why a state v may
be incomparable to the actual state w: either there is reliable evidence not
containing v, or there is evidence containing v but not w. This suggests yet
another modality.
Let M = 〈W,E, V 〉 be an evidence model and define EU (w) = {X ∈
E(w) | w 6∈ X}. This is the unreliable or incorrect evidence at state w. The
corresponding modality is U : “ϕ follows from the unreliable evidence at w”.
Of course, the agent cannot necessarily consistently combine this evidence, but
in the formal definition we can take the union of these sets:
M, w |= [U ]ϕ iff for all v ∈
⋃
EU (w), M, v |= ϕ
It is the conjunction of these two operators that corresponds to safe belief on
evidence models.
These new operators are not definable in our basic language L.
Fact 1. The operators [C] and [U ] are not definable in evidence belief language
LABE4.
Proof. Let M and M′ be uniform evidence models with the evidence sets:
p
w
¬p
¬p p
¬p
p
v
¬p
E E ′
The dashed line is a p-morphisim, so M ≫ M′. So, M, w and M′, v satisfy
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the same formulas of LABE4. However, we have14 M, w |= [C]p ∧ [U ]¬p while
M′, v |= ¬[C]p ∧ ¬[U ]¬p.
This ends our digression on reliable and unreliable evidence as an example
of richer languages supported by our evidence models. This theme of language
extensions will return in Section 7, but for now, we return to the earlier source
of variety, the existence of natural subclasses of evidence models.
We are now ready to clarify the relationship between uniform, flat evidence
models and plausibility models. It will be helpful to start with the following
observation:
Lemma 4. IfM = 〈W, E , V 〉 is a uniform evidence model, then every w ∈ BE is
maximal and every non-empty scenario X is of the form E [w] for some w ∈ BE ,
so that ⋂
X = {v : w 4E v and v 4E w}.
If M is flat as well as uniform, then BE is exactly the set of maximal points
and every collection of the form E [w] with w 4E -maximal is a scenario.
Proof. First assume thatM is a uniform evidence model and w ∈
⋂
X for some
scenario X . It follows that X ⊆ E [w] (since w lies in every element of X ),
and by maximality of X , X = E [w]. But if we had w ≺E v for some v, then
clearly E [w] ( E [v], which would contradict the maximality of X and thus w is
4E-maximal.
Furthermore, the elements of
⋂
E [w] are precisely those v such that w 4E v
(by definition of 4E and E [w]), but from the maximality of w we have that
v 4E w as well.
For the other direction, assume M is flat and uniform and w is maximal.
By Zorn’s lemma, E [w] can be extended to a scenario X . By flatness, we have
that
⋂
X 6= ∅. If w 6∈
⋂
X , there is some v ∈
⋂
X ⊆
⋂
E [w]. But then v lies
in every evidence set containing w, yet there is some Y ∈ X with v ∈ Y and
w 6∈ Y , so by definition w ≺E v, which contradicts the maximality of w. We
conclude that X =
⋂
E [w], and thus w ∈ BE .
With this, we may describe the plausibility orders of evidence models.
Definition 10. Let 4 be a plausibility order over W . Say D ⊆ W is directed
if any two elements of D have an upper bound in D.
A plausibility order 4 satisfies the boundendess condition if every directed
set D has an upper bound (not necessarily in D).
Lemma 5. If an evidence model is flat, then its derived plausibility relation
satisfies the boundedness condition.
14In general, it need not be the case that the agent reliably believes ϕ iff the agent unreliably
believes ¬ϕ. We do not discuss the logic of these operators here, but the reader might note
that the set of reliable evidence at a state is a filter while the set of unreliable evidence is an
ideal.
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Proof. Assume thatM is flat and let D be any directed set. Consider the family
Y = {Y : Y ∩D 6= ∅}. We claim that Y has the fip. Indeed, let Y1, . . . , Yn ∈ Y
and yi ∈ Yi∩D. Let y be an upper bound for all yi (it is an easy exercise to show
that directed sets have upper bounds for finite subsets). Then, by definition,
y ∈
⋂
i≤n Yi.
Thus Y can be extended to a scenario X . Since W is flat, then
⋂
X is
non-empty. But every w ∈
⋂
X is an upper bound for D.
Corollary 2. If M is flat and 4 is its derived plausibility relation then for
every w there is v < w such that v is maximal.
Proof. If 4 is directed it satisfies the conditions of Zorn’s lemma, and we may
use it to find maximal elements above any given w.
Now we are ready to show that belief is definable over flat models:
Theorem 3. Over the class of uniform evidence models with derived plausibility
relation, [A]〈4〉[4]ϕ implies [B]ϕ.
Over the class of models that are moreover flat, they are equivalent.
Proof. First assume that [A]〈4〉[4]ϕ and let X be any scenario. Let w ∈
⋂
X .
By Lemma 4, w is maximal; but since it satisfies 〈4〉[4]ϕ, it follows that w
satisfies ϕ.
Now assume that the model is flat and [B]ϕ holds and let w ∈ W . We have
to show that there is v < w satisfying [4]ϕ. Use Corollary 2 to find a maximal
v < w. By Lemma 4 we have that v lies in
⋂
X for some scenario X . Meanwhile,
if u < v then we also have u ∈
⋂
X , and by the assumption that [B]ϕ holds, u
also satisfies ϕ, i.e. v satisfies [4]ϕ, as desired.
4 The representation theorem
It is generally convenient to work with models that are not necessarily intended,
since it is easier to control accessibility relations than scenarios. Fortunately,
as we shall show in this section, the two classes of models are equivalent with
respect to our logics. For indeed, while it is not the case that every model is
intended, we do have that every model is the p-morphic image of an intended
model.
Our goal is then to define an intended model M▽ given an arbitrary model
M. First, let us define our domain, which depends on the underlying logic.
Below, recall that
B[W ] = {w ∈ W : ∃v ∈W such that v B w}.
Definition 11. LetM = 〈W,E,B,4, V 〉 be a model. Define the following sets:
• W▽ = W▽u is the set of all tuples (w, x, f) where w ∈ W , x ∈ B[W ] ∪ N
and f :W → {0, 1}.
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• W▽♭ is the set of all (w, x, f) ∈W
▽ with x ∈ B[W ].
• W▽♭u is the set of all (w, 0, f) such that w ∈W and f :W → {0, 1}.
Define π(w, x, f) = w.
These will be the domains of our intended models. Note that W▽λ is defined
even if M is not a λ-model, but in this case it will generally not be very use-
ful. We remark that the parameter 0 in the concise case is simply a dummy
parameter which we use for uniformity with the other cases.
Let us begin with a simple observation about the size of W▽:
Lemma 6. The set W▽λ is finite if and only if M is finite and λ is flat.
Before we define evidence sets, which are somewhat more elaborate, let us
define the accessibility relations.
Definition 12. Given a model M = 〈W,E,B,4, V 〉 and an evidence logic λ,
define a relation 4▽λ on W
▽
λ by (w, x, f) 4
▽
λ (v, y, g) if and only if w 4 v, either
x = y ∈ W or x ≤ y ∈ N, and f ↾ ↑ v = g ↾ ↑ v, where ↑ v = {v′ | v 4 v′} is the
upset of v.
The function π as we have defined it is a p-morphism on the restricted
structures:
Lemma 7. The function π :W▽λ →W is a surjective p-morphism with respect
to the signature 4.
Proof. The forth and atoms conditions are straightforward from the definitions
so we focus on back4. But if w 4 v and w = π(w, x, f), then (w, x, f) 4
▽
λ
(v, x, f) and π(v, x, f) = v.
We can now define the neighborhoods we shall use.
Definition 13. We define the following sets:
1. Given v ∈ W , f : W → {0, 1} and X ⊆ W , define Xf(v) to be the set of
all (w, x, g) ∈ W▽♭ such that x = v and g ↾ ↑w = f ↾ ↑w.
2. Given n ∈ N, f : W → {0, 1} and X ⊆ W , define Xfλ (n) to be the set of
all (w,m, g) ∈W▽λ such that m ≥ n and g ↾ ↑w = f ↾ ↑w.
Our evidence relation will be divided into several parts:
1. Given (w, x, f) ∈ W▽ and v ∈ W , let Ev(w, x, f) be the collection of all
sets of the form Xg(v) such that w E X and g ↾↑ v = f ↾↑ v.
2. Given (w, x, f) ∈ W▽, n ∈ N, let Enλ (w, x, f) be the collection of all sets
of the form Xgλ(n) such that w E X and X is not flat for w. Note that
En♭ (w, x, f) = ∅.
If M = 〈W, E , B,4〉 is uniform, define
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1. Given v ∈ W , Ev to be the collection of all sets of the form Xg(v) such
that v ∈ X ∈ E and g(v′) = 1 for all v′ < v.
2. Given n ∈ N, Enu to be the collection of all sets of the form X
g
λ(n) such
that X ∈ E and X is not flat.
3. Define E0♭u to be the collection of all sets of the form X
g
λ(0) such that
X ∈ E.
For non-uniform λ let
E▽λ (w, x, f) = {W
▽
λ } ∪
⋃
wBv
Ev(w, x, f) ∪
⋃
n∈N
Enλ (w, x, f).
Finally, let
E▽u = {W
▽
u } ∪
⋃
v∈B
Ev ∪
⋃
n∈N
Enu and E
▽
♭u = {W
▽
♭u} ∪ E
0
♭u.
We remark that E▽λ (w, x, f) does not depend on x but we write it this way
to conform to the definition of an evidence relation. It will take some work to
check that the belief relation is intended, but less so to check that plausibility
is.
Lemma 8. If M = 〈W,E,B,4, V 〉 is any model then 4▽λ=4E▽ .
If moreover M is uniform then 4▽λ=4E▽ for uniform λ.
Proof. First let us check that 4▽λ ⊆ 4E▽ . Suppose that (w, x, f) 4
▽
λ (v, y, g) and
(w, x, f) ∈ X ∈ E▽(u, z, h). If X = W▽ there is nothing do do, but otherwise
consider three cases:
1. If X = Y h
′
(u′) with u B u′, then we must have x = y = u′, f agrees with
h′ on ↑w and hence g does on ↑ v. It follows that (v, y, g) ∈ Y h
′
(u′).
2. If X = Y h(k), as before the condition on g is satisfied and since x ≤ y we
also have (v, y, g) ∈ Y h(k).
For the other direction, if (w, x, f) 64▽λ (v, y, g), consider now three cases.
1. If w 64 v, then define h to be identical to f except that h(v) 6= g(v) and
define X as follows: if there is u such that w B u, then X = Wh(u);
otherwise, W is not flat for w and we choose X = Whλ (0). In either case
X ∈ E(w, x, f), f agrees with h on ↑w so (w, x, f) ∈ X ∈ E(w, x, h) yet
(v, y, g) 6∈ X .
2. If x 6= y and at least one of them belongs toW (for example, x), find u such
that u B x. Then, (w, x, f) ∈ W f (x) ∈ E(u, x, f) but (u, y, g) 6∈ W f (x).
The cases where either y ∈W but x ∈ N or x > y ∈ N are very similar.
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3. If f ↾ ↑ v 6= g ↾ ↑ v and x ∈W , let x′ be such that x′ B x if x ∈ W . Setting
X =W f (x′) we see that (w, x, f) ∈ X ∈ E(w, x, f) but (v, y, g) 6∈ W f (x′).
If instead x ∈ N, we can set X =W f (0).
We conclude that 4▽λ=4E▽ . The uniform cases are very similar (and simpler).
We can now define our intended models:
Definition 14. Let M = 〈W,E,B,4, V 〉 be a λ-model.
Define V ▽λ =W
▽
λ ∩ π
−1V and set
M▽λ = 〈W
▽
λ , E
▽
λ , V
▽
λ 〉.
These models are convenient because scenarios are easy to identify. Below,
let Ezλ(w, x, f) = E
z(w, x, f) if λ is not uniform, Ezu(w, x, f) = E
z.
Lemma 9. Given a non-concise λ, a λ-model M = 〈W,E,B,4, V 〉 and M▽λ =
〈W▽λ , E
▽
λ , V
▽
λ 〉:
1. for every set X of the form
X = {W▽λ } ∪ E
v
λ(w, x, f), (1)
where w B v, X is a (w, x, f)-scenario, and π (
⋂
X ) = ↑ v;
2. if X is a (w, x, f)-scenario that is not of the above form, then
X ⊆ {W▽λ } ∪
⋃
n∈N
Enλ (w, x, f) (2)
and
⋂
X = ∅.
Proof. We shall only consider the non-uniform case; the uniform one is analo-
gous.
If (v, y, g) ∈ X ∈ Ez(w, x, f), then either y = z ∈ W or y, z ∈ N. It follows
that if X,Y ∈ X are such that X ∈ Ez(w, x, f) and Y ∈ Ez
′
(w, x, f), either
z = z′ ∈ W , z, z′ ∈ N, or X ∩ Y = ∅, where the latter is impossible if X is a
scenario.
Hence every scenario is either contained in a collection of the form (1) or is
of the form (2). Let us first check that collections of the form (1) are indeed
scenarios and have the appropriate intersection.
So assume that X is of form (1) for some v, f with w B v. First note that
if v 4 u then (u, v, f) ∈
⋂
X . For clearly, (u, v, f) ∈ W▽λ and every set in
Ev(w, x, f) is of the form Xvg for some g which agrees with f on ↑ v, thus on
↑u, which means that (u, v, f) ∈ Xf(v). It follows that ↑ v ⊆ π (
⋂
X ).
Moreover, if v 64 u, then any element of π−1(u) is of the form (u, u′, g).
Define a function h which is identical to f except that f(u) 6= g(u). Then,
by definition (u, u′, g) 6∈ Wh(v), yet w E W and h agrees with g on ↑ v so
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that Wh(v) ∈ Ev(w, x, f) and (u, u′, g) 6∈
⋂
X . Since u′, g were arbitrary, we
conclude that u 6∈ π (
⋂
X ). Thus, ↑ v ⊇ π (
⋂
X ), and our claim follows.
Now let us check that if X is of form (2), then it has an empty intersection.
We begin with three simple observations:
1. X contains at least one element of the form Xf(n) with n ∈ N. For indeed,
as discussed above, if X is not of form (1) then it does not intersect any
Ev(w, x, f) with v ∈ W , and the collection {W▽λ } by itself cannot be a
(w, x, f)-scenario, for either w B v for some v, in which case {W▽λ ,W
f (v)}
would still have a non-empty intersection (it includes (v, v, f)), or there is
no such v so that W is not flat for x, and {W▽λ ,W
f
λ (0)} would be a proper
extension with a non-finite intersection (it includes (w, 0, f)).
2. Any element of
⋂
X must be of the form (v, n, g) with n ∈ N (for Xf (n)
contains only elements of this form).
3. If n < k and (v, n, g) ∈ X ∈ X it easily follows that (v, k, g) ∈ X by
case-by-case inspection.
With this, towards a contradiction we assume that (v, n, g) ∈
⋂
X and pick
Xf(m) ∈ X . Thus, (v, n+ 1, g) ∈ Xf(n+ 1) ∩
⋂
X , from which it follows that
(v, n, g) 6∈ Xf (n+ 1) ∩
⋂
X 6= ∅ and thus Xf(n+ 1) 6∈ X ; but this contradicts
the maximality of X , and we conclude that there may be no such point in the
intersection and hence it must be empty.
An immediate corollary of the above is the following:
Corollary 3. If M is flat, then so is M▽♭
Proof. By definition,M▽♭ cannot contain any scenarios of form (2), hence every
scenario must be of form (1) and thus have a non-empty intersection.
We may now collect our results into the following:
Theorem 4. Given a λ-model M, there exists an evidence model M▽λ =
〈W▽λ , E
▽
λ , V
▽
λ 〉 such that M is a p-morphic image of (M
▽
λ)
△.
Further, if M is (i) flat and finite, (ii) flat, (iii) uniform or (iv) finite and
concise, respectively, then so is M▽.
Proof. We have explicity stated and proven most required properties. One ex-
ception is the B-clauses of a p-morphism, but this follows immediately from
Lemma 9, and in the concise case from Lemma 4, using the fact that finite
models are flat, so that BE▽
♭u
is precisely the set of maximal worlds.
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5 Syntactic properties of evidence logics
We now turn our attention to establishing our main completeness results. In
order to do this, we shall collect in this section the preliminary syntactic results
we shall need. Recall that if Θ is a (possibly infinite) set of formulas, Θ ⊢λ ϕ
means that there is finite Θ′ ⊆ Θ such that ⊢λ
∧
Θ′ → ϕ. In this section and
the next we will work exclusively over the full signature σ = EBA4.
Lemma 10. Let Γ be a set of formulas and λ an evidence logic over σ = EBA4.
1. If ϕ ∧ [4]ϕ, [A]Γ ⊢λ ψ, then
[E]ϕ, [A]Γ ⊢λ [E]ψ.
2. If Φ, [A]Γ ⊢λ ψ, then
[B]Φ, [A]Γ ⊢λ [B]ψ.
3. If Φ, [4]∆, [A]Γ ⊢λ ψ, then
[4]Φ, [4]∆, [A]Γ ⊢λ [4]ψ.
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume Γ,Φ to be finite, since in general
we have that Θ ⊢λ α if and only if for some finite Θ′ ⊆ Θ, Θ′ ⊢λ α. Note further
that ∧
[A]Γ↔ [A]
∧
Γ
is derivable in S5, so we can replace [A]Γ by a single formula [A]γ.
1 If ϕ ∧ [4]ϕ, [A]γ ⊢λ ψ, then
⊢λ (ϕ ∧ [4]ϕ) ∧ [A]γ → ψ.
By the monotonicity rule
⊢λ [E] ((ϕ ∧ [4]ϕ) ∧ [A]γ)→ [E]ψ.
Applying the pullout axiom we get
⊢λ [E](ϕ ∧ [4]ϕ) ∧ [A]γ → [E]ψ,
that is,
[E](ϕ ∧ [4]ϕ), [A]γ ⊢λ [E]ψ.
Finally, using plausible evidence we see that
[E]ϕ, [A]γ ⊢λ [E]ψ.
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2 If Φ, [A]γ ⊢λ ψ, since [B] is a normal operator, we also have
[B]Φ, [B][A]γ ⊢λ [B]ψ.
But since [A]α→ [A][A]α and [A][A]α→ [B][A]α are axioms, we also get
[B]Φ, [A]γ ⊢λ [B]ψ.
3 As before we may assume that ∆ is finite. Also, [4] is a normal operator
and we obtain
[4]Φ, [4][4]∆, [4][A]γ ⊢λ [X ]ψ
and, from this,
[4]Φ, [4][4]∆, [A]γ ⊢λ [X ]ψ.
Finally, we use the transitivity of [4] to obtain
[4]Φ, [4]∆, [A]γ ⊢λ [X ]ψ,
as desired.
It will be very useful to draw some dual conclusions from the above result.
Given a set of formulas Φ, define Φ[A] as {ψ | [A]ψ ∈ Φ}, and similarly for the
other modalities. For a set of formulas Γ and a signature σ containing A, if
λ ∈ {Evσ,Evσ♭ }, define Γ
λ = [A]Γ[A] ∪ 〈A〉Γ〈A〉; if λ ∈ {Evσu,Ev
σ
♭u}, define
Γλ =
⋃{
© Γ© :© = [X ], 〈X〉 with X ∈ {E,B,A}
}
.
Lemma 11. Let Γ be a set of formulas and λ an evidence logic over σ = EBA4.
1. If Γ is λ-consistent, α ∈ Γ[E] and δ ∈ Γ〈E〉, then {α ∧ [4]α, δ} ∪ Γλ is
λ-consistent.
2. If Γ is λ-consistent and ψ ∈ Γ〈B〉, then {ψ} ∪ Γ[B] ∪ Γλ is λ-consistent.
3. If Γ is λ-consistent and ψ ∈ Γ〈4〉, then {ψ}∪ [4]Γ[4] ∪Γλ is λ-consistent.
4. If λ ∈ {Evσ♭ ,Ev
σ
♭u}, Γ is λ-consistent and ψ ∈ Γ
[E], then
{ψ ∧ [4]ψ} ∪ Γ[B] ∪ Γλ
is λ-consistent.
Proof. Assume Γ is λ-consistent. As before, we may assume without loss of
generality that Γ is finite.
Note that we have ⊢λ
∧
Γλ ↔ [A]
∧
Γλ independently of λ; over the non-
uniform case, this follows from the axiom 〈A〉ϕ → [A]〈A〉ϕ, while over the
uniform case (i.e., if λ ∈ {Evu,Ev♭u}), this is because ©γ is equivalent to
[A]© γ over λ for any modality © = [X ], 〈X〉 with X ∈ {E,B,A}. Thus we
may replace Γλ by a single formula [A]γ equivalent to
∧
Γλ over λ.
22
1 Suppose otherwise. Then, we would have
α ∧ [4]α, [A]γ ⊢λ ¬δ.
Thus by Lemma 10.1,
[E]α, [A]γ ⊢λ [E]¬δ,
so that
{¬[E]¬δ, [E]α, [A]γ}
is λ-inconsistent. But this is a subset of Γ, contradicting our assumption that
Γ is λ-consistent.
2 Suppose ψ ∈ Γ〈B〉. If the claim were false, then we would have
Γ[B], [A]γ ⊢λ ¬ψ,
and hence, by Lemma 10.2,
[B]Γ[B], [A]γ ⊢λ [B]¬ψ.
Thus
{¬[B]¬ψ, [A]γ} ∪ [B]Γ[B]
would be λ-inconsistent, but this contradicts the consistency of Γ.
3 This is analogous to the previous item but uses Lemma 10.3.
4 If ψ ∈ Γ[E], the claim follows from item 2 above using the derivability of
[E]ψ → 〈B〉(ψ ∧ [4]ψ) by plausible evidence and flatness.
6 Completeness
Throughout this section we will work with logics in the full signature. Recall
that by an evidence logic we will mean exclusively a logic of one of the forms
Ev
σ,Evσ♭ ,Ev
σ
u,Ev
σ
♭u. A λ-type is a maximal λ-consistent set of formulas. We
state the well-known Lindenbaum lemma without proof:
Lemma 12. If Γ is λ-consistent then there is a λ-type ∆ such that Γ ⊆ ∆.
Of course, in a given model all points must satisfy the same universal for-
mulas, so it is convenient to consider the collection of all such types.
Definition 15. Given λ with signature σ = EBA4 and a λ-type Φ, we define
1. typeAλ (Φ) to be the set of all λ-types Ψ such that Ψ
λ = Φλ;
2. typeBλ (Φ) =
{
Ψ ∈ typeAλ (Φ) | Φ
[B] ⊆ Ψ
}
.
Now we need to define evidence sets on our extended evidence models.
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Definition 16. Given a λ-type Φ with [E]α ∈ Φ, we define the α-neighborhood
of Φ, denoted NΦλ (α), as
{
Ψ ∈ typeAλ (Φ) | α, [4]α ∈ Ψ
}
.
Observe that NΦλ (α) depends only on Φ
λ and not on the whole of Φ. We
are now ready to define a canonical extended evidence model :
Definition 17. Let λ be an evidence logic over σ = EAB4 and Φ be a λ-type.
The λ-canonical extended evidence model for Φ is the extended evidence
model Mλ(Φ) = 〈WΦλ , E
Φ
λ , B
Φ
λ ,4
Φ
λ , V
Φ
λ 〉 where
1. WΦλ = type
A
λ (Φ)
2. For each p ∈ At ∩ Γ, Γ ∈ V Φλ (p) iff p ∈ Γ,
3. EΦλ (Γ) =
{
NΦλ (α) | [E]α ∈ Γ
}
,
4. Γ BΦλ ∆ if Γ
[B] ⊆ ∆,
5. Γ 4Φλ ∆ if Γ
[4] ⊆ ∆[4].
Note that our ‘canonical’ extended evidence models are not unique, as they
depend on the type Φ we wish to satisfy and the logic λ we wish to work
in; in this sense they could be considered ‘semicanonical’. Considering different
extended evidence models in this setting is unavoidable, given that our language
includes a universal modality and it is impossible to satisfy all types on a single
model.
Let us begin by showing that canonical models are models in the sense of
Definition 2:
Lemma 13. Given a consistent λ-type Φ with a λ-canonical extended evidence
model Mλ(Φ),
1. For each Γ ∈WΦλ , Γ E
Φ
λ W
Φ
λ ;
2. If [E]α ∈ Φ, NΦλ (α) is non-empty;
3. The relation 4Φλ is a preorder, and whenever Γ 4
Φ
λ ∆ and Γ ∈ X ∈ E(Θ)
it follows that ∆ ∈ X.
4. If Γ 4Φλ ∆ and Θ B
Φ
λ Γ then Θ B
Φ
λ ∆.
Proof. Suppose that Φ is a λ-type.
1 The formulas [E]⊤,⊤ are derivable, so it follows that ⊤ ∈ ∆ for all ∆ ∈WΦλ ;
thus NΦλ (⊤) =W
Φ
λ . Similarly, [E]⊤ ∈ Γ, so that Γ E
Φ
λ W
Φ
λ , as claimed.
2 Put δ = ⊤ in Lemma 11.1 and observe that any λ-type ∆ extending {α ∧
[4]α,⊤} ∪ Γλ belongs to NΦλ (α).
24
3 The transitivity of 4Φλ follows by definition. For the second condition, let
X = NΦλ (α) be any neighborhood of Θ. Since Γ ∈ X it follows that α, [4]α ∈ Γ
so that [4]α ∈ ∆. But then, α ∈ ∆ as well by the truth axiom, so ∆ ∈ X .
4 If Γ 4Φλ ∆ and Θ B
Φ
λ Γ, we need to check that, given [B]ϕ ∈ Θ, we have
ϕ ∈ ∆. But by B-monotonicity we have [B][4]ϕ ∈ Θ, so that [4]ϕ ∈ Γ and
thus [4]ϕ ∈ ∆, which by the truth axiom implies ϕ ∈ ∆.
The next lemmas are the key ingredients in the proof of the Truth Lemma.
Lemma 14. Let λ be an evidence logic over the signature EBA4, and Φ be a
λ-type.
1. If [E]α, 〈E〉β ∈ Γ ∈ WΦλ , there is ∆ ∈ N
Φ
λ (α) with β ∈ ∆.
2. If 〈X〉α ∈ Γ with X ∈ {B,4} there is ∆ such that Γ XΦλ ∆ and α ∈ ∆.
3. If λ ∈ {Ev♭,Ev♭u} and α ∈ Γ
[E], then NΦλ (α) ∩ type
B
λ (Γ) is non-empty.
Proof. Let Φ be a λ-type.
1 Since Γ is λ-consistent and [E]α, 〈E〉β ∈ Γ, we have, by Lemma 11.1, that
{α ∧ [4]α, β} ∪ Γλ
is λ-consistent. This can be extended to a λ-type ∆. Then, by definition we
have ∆ ∈ NΦλ (α) and β ∈ ∆, as desired.
2 For X = B, by Lemma 11.2, since Φ is λ-consistent, we have that
{β} ∪ Γ[B] ∪ Γλ
is λ-consistent as well. Thus, it can be extended to a λ-type ∆. Evidently,
Γ BΦλ ∆ and β ∈ ∆.
The case X = 4 is analogous but uses Lemma 11.3.
3 By Lemma 11.4, if Γ is λ-consistent and λ is flat, then {α} ∪ Γ[B] ∪ Γλ is
λ-consistent as well, and hence can be extended to a Φ-type ∆. Obviously,
∆ ∈ NΦλ (α) ∩ type
B
λ (Γ).
Now let us check that canonical models fall within the appropriate class of
models for each logic.
Lemma 15. Let λ be an evidence logic over EBA4 and Φ be λ-consistent.
Then,
1. If λ is uniform, then so is Mλ(Φ).
2. If λ is flat, then so is Mλ(Φ).
3. If λ = Evσ♭u, then Mλ(Φ) is concise.
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Proof.
1 In the uniform case, we have that both the accessible states and the neigh-
borhoods of Ψ depend only on Ψλ, which is constant amongst all of WΦλ . It
remains to check that if Γ ∈ BΦλ then Γ is 4
Φ
λ -maximal.
So suppose that Γ 4Φλ ∆ and [4]α ∈ ∆. It follows that 〈4〉[4]α ∈ Γ. If
moreover 〈4〉¬α ∈ Γ, then 〈4〉[4]α ∧ 〈4〉¬α ∈ Γ and hence 〈B〉(〈4〉[4]α ∧
〈4〉¬α) ∈ Φ. But then, by the maximality axiom and transitivity of 4,
〈B〉([4]α ∧ 〈4〉¬α) ∈ Φ, which cannot be, since Φ is consistent.
We then conclude that [4]α ∈ Γ and, since α was arbitary, ∆ 4Φλ Γ, as
required.
2 This amounts to showing that if Γ EΦλ X , there is ∆ ∈ X such that Γ B
Φ
λ
∆. But this is immediate from the definition of the accessibility relation and
neighborhoods on canonical extended evidence models and Lemma 14.3.
3 As we have already seen thatMλ(Φ) is both flat and uniform, it remains to
check that if Γ is 4Φλ -maximal then Γ ∈ B
Φ
λ .
Whenever [B]ϕ ∈ Γ it follows that 〈4〉[4]ϕ ∈ Γ by conciseness. If Γ is 4Φλ -
maximal then it also follows that ϕ ∈ Γ; otherwise [4]ϕ 6∈ Γ, while by Lemma
14.3 there would be ∆ with Γ 4Φλ ∆ and [4]ϕ ∈ ∆, so that Γ ≺
Φ
λ ∆. But this
would contradict the maximality of Γ. Thus Γ BΦλ Γ, and since B
Φ
λ is constant
this means that Γ ∈ BΦλ .
We are now ready to prove our own version of the ‘Truth Lemma’:
Proposition 1 (Truth Lemma). Given a λ-type Φ we have that, for every
formula ψ and every Γ ∈ typeAλ (Φ),
ψ ∈ Γ⇔ Γ ∈ [[ψ]]Mλ(Φ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of ψ. The only interesting
cases are the modalities [E], [B] and [4] (and their duals).
Suppose first that [E]ψ ∈ Γ, and let X = NΦλ (ψ). By definition, we have
ψ ∈ Θ for every Θ ∈ X , and by the induction hypothesis this implies that for
each Θ ∈ X , Θ ∈ [[ψ]]Mλ(Φ). Thus, X is a neighborhood of Γ (X ∈ E
Φ
λ (Γ)) with
X ⊆ [[ψ]]Mλ(Φ), so Γ ∈ [[[E]ψ]]Mλ(Φ), as desired.
Now, assume that 〈E〉ψ ∈ Γ. Let X be any neighborhood of Γ. Then
X = NΦλ (α) for some α. Hence, [E]α ∈ Γ and 〈E〉ψ ∈ Γ. By Lemma 14.1, there
is Θ ∈ NΦλ (α) with ψ ∈ Θ. By the induction hypothesis, Θ ∈ [[ψ]]Mλ(Φ), and,
since X was arbitrary, we conclude that Γ ∈ [[〈E〉ψ]]Mλ(Φ).
Let us now consider [B]ψ ∈ Γ. Suppose that Γ BΦλ ∆. Then, by definition
ψ ∈ ∆, which by the induction hypothesis implies ∆ ∈ [[ψ]]Mλ(Φ). Thus, Γ ∈
[[[B]ψ]]Mλ(Φ)
Assume next that 〈B〉ψ ∈ Γ. By Lemma 14.3, ψ ∈ Θ for some Θ ∈ typeBλ (Γ).
But then Γ BΦλ Θ, and thus Γ ∈ [[〈B〉ψ]]Mλ(Φ).
The cases for [4]ψ, 〈4〉ψ are similar and we skip them.
26
We recall that forM▽♭u to be concise, we require thatM be concise and finite.
Thus we need to produce finite models; we shall do so by a filtration argument,
which requires only a slight modification from the standard construction.
Definition 18. Given a λ-type Φ and a formula ϕ, we define Mλ(Φ)/ϕ =
〈W
Φ/ϕ
λ , E
Φ/ϕ
λ , B
Φ/ϕ
λ ,4
Φ/ϕ
λ , V
Φ/ϕ
λ 〉 as follows:
1. Write Γ ≡ϕ ∆ if
(a) for every subformula ψ of ϕ, ψ ∈ Γ if and only if ψ ∈ ∆, and
(b) Γ is 4Φλ -maximal if and only if ∆ is.
Then, let W
Φ/ϕ
λ be the set of equivalence classes of type
A(Φ) modulo ≡ϕ.
We denote the equivalence class of Γ by [Γ]ϕ.
2. For X = B,4, [Γ]ϕ X
Φ/ϕ
λ [∆]ϕ if and only if there are Γ
′ ≡ϕ Γ and
∆′ ≡ϕ ∆ with Γ′ XΦλ ∆
′.
3. [Γ]ϕ E
Φ/ϕ
λ X if there is Γ
′ ≡ϕ Γ and Y ∈ EΦλ (Γ) such that X = [Y ]ϕ =
{[∆]ϕ : ∆ ∈ Y }.
4. If p is a subformula of ϕ then V
Φ/ϕ
λ (p) = {[Γ]ϕ : p ∈ Γ}; otherwise,
V
Φ/ϕ
λ (p) = ∅.
The following is standard and we present it withouth proof:
Lemma 16. If ψ is a subformula of ϕ, then Γ ∈ JψKMλ(Φ) if and only if
[Γ]ϕ ∈ JψKMλ(Φ)/ϕ.
To check that filtered models preserve conciseness, we must make sure that
they preserve maximal elements:
Lemma 17. Given a λ-type Φ, a formula ϕ and Γ ∈WΦλ , [Γ]ϕ is 4
Φ/ϕ
λ -maximal
if and only if Γ is 4Φλ -maximal.
Proof. If Γ is maximal and [Γ]ϕ 4
Φ/ϕ
λ [∆]λ, there are Γ
′ ≡ϕ Γ and ∆′ ≡ϕ ∆
such that Γ′ 4Φλ ∆
′; but then, Γ′ is maximal by definition so that ∆′ 4 Γ′ and
thus [∆]ϕ 4
Φ/ϕ
λ [Γ]ϕ, establishing the maximality of [Γ]ϕ.
For the other direction, it suffices to show that, given Γ ∈ WΦλ , there is
∆ < Γ such that ∆ is maximal; for then, if Γ is not maximal, then no Γ′ ≡ϕ Γ is
maximal, whereas every ∆′ ≡ϕ ∆ is maximal, so Γ′ 6< ∆′ and [∆]ϕ ≻
Φ/ϕ
λ [Γ]ϕ.
But if X ⊆ W
Φ/ϕ
λ is totally ordered, it is not hard to check that X has an
upper bound (pick any λ-type extending [4] (
⋃
X)
[4]
). Thus by Zorn’s lemma,
the set of upper bounds of Γ has a maximal element, as needed.
With this we may prove the following:
Lemma 18. Given a ♭u-type Φ and a formula ϕ, M♭u(Φ)/ϕ is finite and
concise.
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Proof. The finiteness is obvious because there can only be finitely many ≡ϕ-
equivalence classes. It is not too hard to see that M♭u(Φ)/ϕ is flat, for if
X = [Y ]ϕ is any neighborhood of [Γ]ϕ, by flatness we have that Γ B
Φ
♭u ∆ for
some ∆ ∈ Y and thus [Γ]ϕ B
Φ/ϕ
♭u [∆]ϕ ∈ X . It is also easy to see that B
Φ/ϕ
♭u ,
E
Φ/ϕ
♭u are constants given that B
Φ
♭u, E
Φ
♭u are.
It remains to check the maximality clause. But this is immediate from
Lemma 17, for indeed [Γ]ϕ is maximal if and only if Γ is, which in turn is
equivalent to Γ ∈ BΦ♭u and thus to [Γ]ϕ ∈ B
Φ/ϕ
♭u .
6.1 Completeness theorem
With the work developed in previous sections, we are ready to state and prove
our main completeness results.
Theorem 5. Each evidence logic λ over the full signature EBA4 is sound and
strongly complete for the class of λ-models. Moreover,
1. Ev,Ev♭,Ev♭u are sound and strongly complete for their class of evidence
models,
2. Ev♭u is sound and weakly complete for its class of finite evidence models.
Proof. Let Φ be λ-consistent and let Θ be a λ-type extending Φ. Then, let
Mλ(Θ) be its canonical λ-structure. By Lemma 15, Mλ(Φ) is a λ-model, and
by Proposition 1, given ϕ ∈ Θ, Θ ∈ [[ϕ]]Mλ(Θ), so that Φ is satisfied byMλ(Θ).
By Theorem 4, Mλ(Θ)▽λ is a λ-evidence model also satisfying Θ if λ 6= Ev♭u.
The completeness of Ev♭u for its evidence models requires a filtration. Let
ϕ be ♭u-consistent and Φ be a ♭u-type extending ϕ. Then, considerM♭u(Φ)/ϕ.
By Lemma 18, M♭u(Φ)/ϕ is finite, concise and by Lemma 16, satisfies ϕ. It
then follows from Theorem 4 that (M♭u(Φ)/ϕ)
▽
♭u is a finite, concise evidence
model which satisfies ϕ.
We know that Ev and Evu do not have the finite evidence model property,
but the question of whether they have finite extended models remains open.
Other important questions left open are: does Ev♭ have the finite evidence
model property? Is Ev♭u strongly complete for its class of evidence models?
We conjecture affirmative answers to these questions, but leave them for future
inquiry.
7 Dynamic extensions
The logical systems studied in the previous sections are interesting in their own
right as they combine features of both normal and non-normal modal logics in
a non-trivial way. An additional appealing feature of the systems studied here,
following their original introduction in [36], is our fresh interpretation of neigh-
borhood structures. Viewing neighborhoods as bodies of evidence suggested a
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number of new and interesting modalities beyond the usual repertoire studied
in modal neighborhood logics. We will now show briefly how this process of
language elicitation can be taken further when we take a further step, toward a
dynamic perspective.
Evidence is not a static substance that we have once and for all. It is con-
tinually affected by new incoming information, and also by processes of internal
re-evaluation. Taking a cue from recent dynamic logics of knowledge update
[38, 33] and belief revision [32, 5], van Benthem and Pacuit [36] study a number
of dynamic extensions of evidence models. They develop a rich repertoire of
dynamic logics of “evidence management”. We will follow one such thread here,
showing the new logical issues that arise.
The simplest type of information change is receiving information form an
infallible source. This operation is called public announcement [24, 12] and
it transforms a model by removing all states where the announced formula is
false. From the perspective of our evidence models, such a basic action in
possible worlds models is actually a compound of various transformations. A
public announcement of ϕ can be naturally “deconstructed” into a complex
combination of three distinct operations:
1. Evidence addition: the agent accepts that ϕ is an “admissible” piece of
evidence (perhaps on par with the other available evidence).
2. Evidence removal: the agent removes any evidence for ¬ϕ.
3. Evidence modification: the agent incorporates ϕ into each piece of
evidence gathered so far, making ϕ the most important piece of evidence.
Our richer evidence models allows us to study each of these operations individ-
ually (cf. [36]). In this section, we focus on just one of these: accepting an input
from a trusted source, leaving other dynamic operations for further study. Let
M be an evidence model and ϕ a new piece of evidence which the agent decides
to accept. Here “acceptance” does not necessarily mean that the agent believes
that ϕ is true, but rather that she agrees that ϕ should be considered when
“weighing” her evidence. The formal definition of this action is straightforward:
Definition 19 (Evidence Addition). Let M = 〈W,E, V 〉 be an evidence model,
and ϕ a formula in L. The model M+ϕ = 〈W+ϕ, E+ϕ, V +ϕ〉 has W+ϕ = W ,
V +ϕ = V and for all w ∈W ,
E+ϕ(w) = E(w) ∪ {[[ϕ]]M}.
This operation can be described explicitly in our modal language with a
dynamic modality [+ϕ]ψ which is intended to mean “ψ is true after ϕ is accepted
as an admissible piece of evidence”. The truth condition for this formula is
straightforward:
(EA) M, w |= [+ϕ]ψ iff M, w |= Eϕ implies M+ϕ, w |= ψ.
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Here, since evidence sets cannot be empty, the precondition for evidence addition
is that ϕ is true at some state. Compare this with the better-known precondition
for public announcement which requires the accepted formula to be true. The
logical analysis of even this simple operation is surprisingly subtle, suggesting
a number of interesting extensions to the modal languages for evidence studied
in this paper.
Let us start with laws of reasoning for the dynamic modalities, extending
the logics that we had so far. For languages only containing the evidence and
universal modality, we have the following new kind of validities, that may be
viewed as “recursion laws” for evidence and knowledge modalities after an act
of evidence addition:
[+ϕ]p ↔ (〈A〉ϕ→ p) (p ∈ At)
[+ϕ](ψ ∧ χ) ↔ ([+ϕ]ψ ∧ [+ϕ]χ)
[+ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (〈A〉ϕ→ ¬[+ϕ]ψ)
[+ϕ][E]ψ ↔ (Eϕ→ ([E][+ϕ]ψ ∨ [A](ϕ→ [+ϕ]ψ)))
[+ϕ]Aψ ↔ (〈A〉ϕ→ [A][+ϕ]ψ)
But things can quickly get more complicated. Finding a similar recursion law
for the belief operator of this paper requires an extension to our basic language.
This is the operator Bϕψ of conditional belief: “the agent believes ψ conditional
on ϕ”, which is well-known, but now with a new twist in our setting. Some
of the agent’s current evidence may be inconsistent with ϕ (i.e., disjoint with
[[ϕ]]M). If one is restricting attention to situations where ϕ is true, then such
inconsistent evidence must be “ignored”. Here is how we can deal with this in
our models:
Definition 20 (Relativized scenarios.). Suppose that X ⊆ W . Given a col-
lection X of subsets of W (i.e., X ⊆ ℘(W )), the relativization of X to X is
the set XX = {Y ∩ X | Y ∈ X}. We say that a collection X of subsets of W
has the finite intersection property relative to X (X-f.i.p.) if, for each
{X1, . . . , Xn} ⊆ XX ,
⋂
1≤i≤nXi 6= ∅. We say that X is a w-scenario relative
to X when X ⊆ E(w) and X has the maximal X-f.i.p..
To simplify notation, when X is the truth set of formula ϕ, we write “Xϕ”
for “X [[ϕ]]M” and “X is a ϕ-scenario (for w)” for “X is a w-scenario relative to
[[ϕ]]M”. Now we define a natural notion of conditional belief:
• M, w |= [B]ϕψ iff for each ϕ-scenario X ⊆ E(w), for each v ∈
⋂
Xϕ,
M, v |= ψ
Conditional belief is an entirely natural notion in probability and belief re-
vision theory. Still, this notion suggests a logical investigation beyond what we
have provided in this paper. First of all, strikingly, [B]ϕ→ [B]ψϕ is not valid.
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One can compare this to the failure of monotonicity for antecedents in condi-
tional logic. In our more general setting which allows inconsistencies among
accepted evidence, even the following variant is not valid: [B]ϕ → ([B]ψϕ ∨
[B]¬ψϕ). To see this, consider an evidence model with E(w) = {X1, Y1, X2, Y2}
where the sets are defined as follows:
X1 Y1
¬p,¬q p, q p,¬q
X2 Y2
p,¬q ¬p, q ¬p,¬q
Then, M, w |= [B]q; however,M, w 6|= [B]pq ∨ [B]¬pq. This counter-example is
interesting, as our putative implication is indeed valid on connected plausibility
models for conditional belief (cf. [8] for a complete modal logic of conditional
belief on such models). Now in principle, our earlier axiomatization captures
conditional belief as well, since there is a definition for it in terms of safe belief
that arises from relativizing the earlier definition of belief in terms of safe belief
and the universal modality (cf. [7, 9, 33]). But things get more subtle when
we consider the dynamics of evidence addition once more. Clearly, to keep
the total system in harmony, we must provide a recursion law, not just for pure
beliefs, but also for conditional beliefs. And then the earlier static base language
requires extension once more:
The notion of conditional belief alone does not yet allow us to state a re-
cursion axiom. To see this, note that Bϕψ may be true at a state w without
having any w-scenarios that imply ϕ (i.e., there is no w-scenario X such that⋂
X ⊆ [[ϕ]]M). A more general form of conditioning appropriate to this set-
ting is Bϕ,αψ where “the agent believes that ψ, after having settled on α and
conditional on ϕ”. Formally,
• M, w |= [B]ϕ,ψχ iff for all maximally ϕ-compatible sets X ⊆ E(w), if⋂
X ∩ [[ϕ]]M ⊆ [[ψ]]M, then
⋂
X ∩ [[ϕ]]M ⊆ [[χ]]M.
Note that [B]
+ϕ
can be defined as Bϕ,⊤. We also write [B]
−ϕ
for [B]
⊤,¬ϕ
. With
this operator added, we can indeed state a recursion law for our operators of
absolute and conditional belief (the proofs that these axioms are valid can be
found in [36]):
[+ϕ][B]ψ ↔ (〈A〉ϕ→ ([B]+ϕ[+ϕ]ψ ∧ [B]−ϕ[+ϕ]ψ))
[+ϕ][B]ψ,αχ ↔ (〈A〉ϕ→ ([B]ϕ∧[+ϕ]ψ,[+ϕ]α[+ϕ]χ ∧ [B][+ϕ]ψ,¬ϕ∧[+ϕ]α[+ϕ]χ))
Finally, recursion laws for evidence addition and our plausibility modali-
ties also raise interesting new issues. Recall that a condition on our models
(Definition 2) is that the evidence sets are upwards closed under the plausi-
bility relation. This means that the precondition for adding a new piece of
evidence to an arbitrary model is that it is upwards closed under the plausibil-
ity ordering. Alternatively, we can introduce a new evidence addition operation
E⊕X(w) = E(w) ∪ {X ′} where X ′ = {u | there is a v ∈ X such that v 4 u}.
We leave a full analysis of this new operation for future work.
What we have shown so far is how a logical analysis of evidence dynamics
that changes given neighborhood models for agents uncovers the need for new
modalities in our base language of evidence models. Clearly, there are many
new questions of axiomatization resulting from this, but other kinds of issues
emerge as well. We conclude with just a simple illustration.
There is a natural issue of “harmony” between two perspectives on evidence
dynamics. As we have seen, on evidence models M = 〈W,E, V 〉, we can de-
rive the plausibility ordering directly from the evidence set (see Definition 6).
Viewed in this way, an addition to the agent’s evidence also changes the agent’s
plausibility ordering. But this means that we can also look at evidence change in
terms of transformations of models of a more familiar relational kind, described
in Section 2.2: namely, plausibility orderings of epistemic ranges. Belief change
on models of the latter kind has been studied extensively: cf. [5, 33, 21], and
this suggests a parallel line of inquiry finding dynamic operations on plausibility
orderings matching changes in the agent’s evidence.
For evidence addition, the corresponding technical question is which opera-
tion makes the following diagram commute:
E
4E
E+
4+
+X
??
And the answer is not hard to find. Suppose that 4+=4 −{(w, v) | w ∈
X and v 6∈ X}. Then,
4+=4E+
This simple observation is in line with the study of “two-level models” for prefer-
ence dynamics in [21], to which we refer for further relevant results. The extent
of these harmony phenomena remains to be investigated, where we expect our
earlier distinction between general and intended models, suitably generalized to
the dynamic setting, to be important once more.
Our discussion of the dynamics of evidence change shows one further way in
which neighborhood structures are a good vehicle for exploring finer epistemic
and doxastic distinctions than those found in standard relational models for
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modal logic. At the same time, this richness means that new techniques may
be needed in the logical analysis of this richer form of neighborhood semantics.
Model-theoretically, we need stronger notions of bisimulation and p-morphism
matching the more expressive languages that emerged in the formulation of
dynamic recursion laws, while proof-theoretically, we need to lift our earlier
completeness technique to this richer setting.
8 Concluding remarks
Starting from earlier work on evidence logics in neighborhood models, this paper
has offered two main new contributions. First, our completeness theorems con-
tribute to the general study of basic evidence logic and its dynamics. Second, in
doing so, we develop a new perspective on neighborhood models that suggests
extensions of the usual systems, even without any specific evidence interest in
mind. For the modal logician, the pleasant surprise of our analysis is that there
is a lot of well-motivated new modal structure to be explored on models that
are often considered totally explored.
Clearly, many open problems remain. These start at the base level of the
motivations for our framework, touched upon lightly earlier on. For instance,
our framework still needs to be related to other modal logics of evidence [27, 15]
and argumentation [14]. Closer to what we have presented, however, here are a
few more specific avenues for future research:
• Further interpretations: By imposing additional constraints on the evi-
dence relations (i.e., the neighborhood functions), we get evidence models
that are topological spaces. Can we also give a spatial interpretation to
our belief operator and the new matching modalities discussed in Sec-
tion 7? This would suggest new, richer modal logics for reasoning about
topological spaces (cf. [34]).
• Computational complexity: Neighborhood logics are often NP-complete,
while basic modal logics on relational models are often Pspace-complete.
What about mixtures of the two?
• Extended model theory: Combining existing notions of bisimulation for
relational models and neighborhood models takes us only so far. What
new notions of bisimulation directly on evidence models will match our
extended modal languages? And in this setting, can the key representation
method of this paper (Theorem 4) be extended to deal with such richer
languages?
• Extended proof theory: How can we axiomatize the richer modal logic
of neighborhood models that arises in our dynamic analysis? Will the
techniques of our completeness proofs carry over, or do we need a new
style of analysis of canonical models?
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Once again, we end with Sergei Artemov’s work on justification logics. As
we have said in the Introduction, our evidence models provide a coarser level
of analysis somewhere above the syntactic detail of proof terms. In conclusion,
we briefly highlight two further comparisons. In an evidence model, the agent
has evidence for ϕ provided there is a proposition (i.e., a set of states) that
the agent has identified as evidence which logically implies ϕ. An important
feature of justification logic is that a proof term not only records the fact that
certain beliefs are grounded in evidence, but also the proof of why that evidence
justifies a particular belief. A second point of comparison is that our notion of
evidence is weaker than what is found in the justification logic literature. Having
a justification for ϕ means, in particular, that the agent believes that ϕ is true.
Contrast this with our setting in which an agent only believes what is implied
by all of her evidence. Clearly, this only scratches the surface and there is much
more to say about the connection with justification logic, but this will be left
for future work.
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